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THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER: JUDICIAL JURIS-

DICTION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY.

By Martin H. Redish.

Durham: Carolina Academic Press. 1991. Pp. viii, 192. $24.95.
Despite the central position of federal jurisdiction in the American
political scheme, few scholarly books have addressed the subject.
Most federal courts scholarship remains primarily in textbooks,I hornbooks, 2 and law review articles.3 Professor Martin Redish 4 has taken
a step toward filling this void with the publication of The Federal
Courts in the PoliticalOrder.
Redish believes scholars have shrunk from applying political theory to issues of federal jurisdiction, yet he is not the first scholar to
marry political theory and jurisdictional doctrine. All scholarly discourse on federal jurisdiction has been, in some sense, premised on
political theory. Nevertheless, The Federal Courts in the PoliticalOrder makes a valuable contribution to the federal courts literature by
identifying and criticizing the political premises behind the various
commentaries regarding federal jurisdiction and providing its own
normative political theory to buttress jurisdictional doctrines.
Professor Redish criticizes and builds jurisdictional doctrines from
two fundamental precepts of American political theory: the representational and countermajoritarian principles. These two principles are
at once complementary and antipodal; they are two sides of the same
coin.
The representational principle provides simply that judges may not
ignore constitutionally valid legislative policy choices (p. 4). The
countermajoritarian principle, in contrast, provides that courts may
not avoid their duty to adjudicate constitutional challenges to legislative, executive, or agency action (p. 4). To Redish, any political system providing for judicial review logically and ineluctably recognizes
each of these theoretical underpinnings. Consequently, because jurisdictional doctrines such as judge-made abstention and most political
question doctrine (which itself might be viewed as a horizontal or interbranch form of abstention) allow courts to avoid their constitutionally mandated functions, they impermissibly flout the representational
and countermajoritarian principles. Judges' time would be better
1. See, eg., PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (3d ed. 1988).
2. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION (1989).
3. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term - Foreword: The Passive
Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REv. 40 (1961); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959).
4. Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
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spent grappling with the merits of the cases before them than fashioning abstruse excuses to avoid such substantive inquiry.
Redish fortifies his two fundamental principles, therefore, by debunking the validity of the abstention and political question doctrines.
Indeed, The Federal Courts in the PoliticalOrder largely derives from

law review articles Redish had previously published on each subject; 5
it does not cover all, or even most of the issues one might encounter in
a traditional federal courts curriculum. It does not discuss, for example, federal habeas corpus, or even federal question jurisdiction.
Rather, it focuses squarely on the judge-made doctrines that regulate
the exercise of judicial review.
Redish opens the book by using the representational principle to
attack some of the modem, "progressive" views on the appropriate
role of the judiciary (Chapter Two). Specifically, the representational
principle leaves no room for hermeneutics that allow judges to make
any policy choices outside of those made in validly enacted legislation.
Take, for example, "neo-republican" theory. Neo-republican theory
takes root from public choice theory, which postulates that legislation
represents compromises among elite special interests in derogation of
the public good 6 and adds that judges should free themselves from the
shackles of legislative intent and seek to identify superior values upon
which to make decisions. 7 From the perspective of the representational principle, Redish views neo-republican theory as "the epitome
of anti-democratic thought" (p. 13). Any dichotomy between public
values and private interests is inherently false in a democratic system
(p. 14).

Redish criticizes other modes of statutory construction along similar lines. The "textual deconstructionist" (pp. 20-22), "political
deconstructionist" (p. 22), and "functionalist" (pp. 22-24), as well as

the "neo-republican" (pp. 24-25) models of statutory interpretation all
posit that legislative intent, if it in fact may be discerned, should not
bind the decisionmaker. Consequently, each model suffers from the
same antidemocratic plague and misguided assumptions about the judiciary's ability to identify objectively anything other than legislative
intent. Curiously, Professor Redish does not believe that the judiciary
5. Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the JudicialFunction, 94 YALE L.. 71 (1984); Martin H. Redish, JudicialReview and the "PoliticalQuestion," 79
Nw. U. L. REv. 1031 (1984-85).
6. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudenceof Public Choice, 65 TEXAS
L. REv. 873 (1987); Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 167 (1988).
7. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What is Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV.
L. REv. 1695 (1989); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional
Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 543 (1986); Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97
YALE L.J. 1539, 1582 (1988); Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in American PublicLaw, 38 STAN.
L. REV. 29, 31-32 (1985); Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493
(1988).
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should always remain value-neutral; occasionally, he notes, it must exercise its "gap-filling" function:
[While t]he most important insight [of the representational principle] is
that nonconstitutionally controlled issues - including those involving
judicial jurisdiction - are to be resolved on the basis of judicial policy
assessment only to the extent that the representative branches have not
already made that policy choice through legislative action.., situations
will arise in which a good-faith judicial effort to determine whether and how - a statute resolves a specific question will... be effectively
fruitless. In such an event, judicial resolution on the basis of the court's
own assessment of the competing social and political policies will probably be unavoidable . . . . But, . . . judicial resort to such a practice
[should] come only as a last resort .... [p. 19]
Considering the vigor with which Redish derides judges for making policy choices, one might wonder why Redish allows for any "exceptions" to the formalistic rigor of the representational principle.
Worse, because much, if not all, judicial decisionmaking involves some
form of gap-filling, the exception comes dangerously close to swallowing the rule. In short, the gap-filling exception stands as a bald anomaly - Redish simply fails to reconcile this exception logically with the
representational principle, and therefore to explain his dogmatic
retreat.
Before using the representational principle as a foil against judgemade abstention, Redish discusses the implications of the principle for
federal common law. Not surprisingly, the representational principle
requires that judges cannot make federal common law. Legislatures
may vest broad discretion in courts to fashion "common law," as in
labor law, 8 but courts that make such rules are really engaging in statutory interpretation (p. 33).
To argue that the making of common law and "gap-filling" according to independent, judicial policy choices are forms of statutory interpretation borders on the preposterous. Evidently Redish has assumed,
through the representational principle, that all lawmaking must devolve from legislatures. As a result, he must transmute what the ordinary observer would call judicial lawmaking - such as the making of
a common law of labor agreements - into statutory interpretation.
The history of our political system reveals, however, that lawmaking
has never been confined solely to legislatures; at the very least, courts
have always been assumed to have some power to make law. 9 The real
question is niot who can make law, but what confines each governmental branch's lawmaking power.
8. See § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988)),
interpreted in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (§ 301 allows judges
to develop a common law governing collective bargaining agreements).
9. See Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Powerof the FederalCourts, 12 PACE L. REv. (forthcoming 1992).
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Redish does not discuss the limits on the extent to which legislatures may convey lawmaking power to the courts. The representational principle and separation of powers concerns may have even
greater force than Redish has acknowledged. Would legislatures violate the representational principle by abdicating their obligation to
make policy; for example, by passing a law vesting all lawmaking authority in federal courts as far as the Constitution would allow Congress to legislate? Redish should have expended greater effort to
define the contours of proper legislative constraint.10
Moreover, Redish construes the Rules Decision Act'1 - providing
that state law applies in federal courts except when preempted by federal or constitutional law - as an independent congressional judgment that courts should not create federal common law. That position
is a far cry from the posture of those arguing that courts have no independent authority to make federal common law, and it echoes the
logic of Erie RailroadCo. v. Tompkins.1 2 Whatever the weaknesses of
Redish's interpretation of the Rules Decision Act, they do not detract
from his cogent criticism of Professors Westen and Lehman's construction of the Rules Decision Act to justify judicial power to make
federal common law.1 3 Redish convincingly demonstrates that Westen and Lehman premise their argument that federal common law is
itself a "rule of decision" on the belief that statutory interpretation
and common lawmaking are not inherently different (p. 32). Given
that a difference exists (and Redish argues persuasively that it does,
though this is a controversial argument whose persuasiveness may depend largely on its aesthetic appeal), courts should be able to recognize
it and thus limit themselves to the tasks of statutory interpretation and
14
gap-filling.
In some sense, the chapter on federal common law is an interlude;
it is judge-made abstention that feels the full brunt of Redish's onslaught with the representational principle rapier. Judge-made abstention - the jurisdictional doctrine by which federal courts, despite
having valid jurisdiction, refrain from deciding a case on the merits to
further federalism and judicial efficiency1 5 - is judicial usurpation of
legislative power (p. 49). Because abstention frustrates the enforce10. See p. 33 for Redish's minimal offering in this regard.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988).
12. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). For a discussion of this point, see John H. Ely, The Irrepressible
Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REv. 693, 704 (1974).
13. See Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REv. 311 (1980).
14. Pp. 33-42. One might query whether federal common law is really a form of gap-filling;
if so, then Redish would have to concede that the Rules Decision Act allows federal common
lawmaking just as Westen and Lehman argue. In that case, Redish's earlier failure to account for
gap-filling in terms of the representational principle would take on even greater significance.
15. See Railroad Commn. of Tex. v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Younger v. Harris, 401

U.S. 37 (1971).
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ment of validly legislated policy choices and amounts to the exercise of
an independent policy choice without requisite statutory authority,
any such decision not to exercise jurisdiction violates the separation of
powers principle (p. 50). Abstention, even when it merely delays a
federal court's decision on the merits, amounts to statutory repeal (p.

50).
Redish does not believe that notions of discretion are inherent in
the concept of jurisdiction. Professor David Shapiro, one of the most
noteworthy critics of Redish's position in this regard, has pointed out
that the judiciary has always exercised some quantum of bounded discretion, as exemplified by doctrines such asforum non conveniens, pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, and ripeness, and by general common
law history. 16 Redish responds to this criticism (correspondingly updating and clarifying the position taken in his law review article) with
two types of arguments. First, he distinguishes from abstention each
of the putatively analogous examples of discretion-based doctrine by
highlighting various functional differences between abstention and
those other doctrines (pp. 64-67). For example, forum non conveniens
is "geographically, rather than systemically, based." 17 Arguments of
this kind are facile - Shapiro's argument is easily neutralized by atomization and piecemeal criticism of each analogy - but they miss
the point. Why should the judiciary ever, under any doctrine, exercise
discretion without statutory authorization?
Aware of that criticism, Redish suggests that Shapiro's "empirical" argument is irrelevant to Redish's own "normative" critique (p.
63); hence, Redish's normative argument applies to the abstention
"analogues" as well. Indeed, he suggests that pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction also may be subject to separation-of-powers attack (p. 66).
Yet Redish's rebuttal to Shapiro ignores Shapiro's normative theme:
that courts might be institutionally better adapted to the jurisdictional
fine-tuning involved in abstention, thus justifying abstention as judgemade doctrine on institutional grounds.1 8
The second half of the book establishes the countermajoritarian
principle as the lens through which to focus case-and-controversy
(standing), mootness, ripeness, and political question doctrines. The
countermajoritarian principle proceeds from Professor Redish's belief
that "judicial review is [not] a physical necessity of a constitutional
system, [but] a logical or practicalnecessity" (p. 79). Consequently,
courts have an unflagging obligation to enforce the provisions of the
Constitution. The judiciary is the only institution designed for such a
function.
16. David L. Shapiro, Jurisdictionand Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543 (1985).
17. P. 65. He further notes that Congress eventually codified the doctrine of forum non
conveniens at 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988). Id.
18. See Shapiro, supra note 16, at 574.
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The countermajoritarian principle thus contrasts with Professor
Alexander Bickel's "passive virtues" 19 rationales of discretionary judicial restraint. Furthermore, Redish has no qualms with the antidemocratic nature of judicial review. He sees judicial review as a
logical necessity of a constitutional system. Courts should not therefore create complex and technical doctrines merely in order to minimize the political impact of the judiciary (p. 87).
Once one accepts, as Redish does, such a grand, indeed active, role
for the judiciary, the various justiciability doctrines - as fashioned by
the courts and rationalized by various commentators - are easy prey.
For example, Redish assails the "injury-in-fact" 20 requirement for a
Constitutional "case-or-controversy" 21 as
fundamentally inconsistent with recognition of the judiciary's important

political role in providing a constitutional check on the majorit[]arian
branches, as dictated by the Counter-Majoritarian principle. By super-

imposing a "private rights" model of adjudication on constitutional litigation, use of the injury-in-fact requirement effectively undermines
judicial performance of that role. [p. 89]

In turn, the "private rights" model, which posits that courts should
only decide disputes between individuals, 22 straightjackets courts from
properly adjudicating many cases of "macro-impact on the national
political process" (pp. 93-94). Moreover, injury-in-fact is not an intrinsic feature of judicial restraint. Instead, "the appropriate battleground for judicial restraint is in the fashioning of the substantive
decision" (p. 95).

Redish paints "political question" doctrine 23 as the most pernicious of the "passive virtues." The book's penultimate chapter is devoted entirely to this subject. In short, Redish reasons, first, that
political question doctrine exists, contrary to Professor Louis Henkin's
assertions, 24 and second, that one cannot argue inany principled way
that the judiciary is responsible for interpreting some constitutional
clauses but not others (p. 117). Only if the judiciary has the last word

on the whole literary corpus of the Constitution can it felicitously
check the majoritarian branches (pp. 124-25, 134-36). Like the repre19. See generally ALExANDER M. BicKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111-98
(1962); Bickel, supra note 3.
20. See, eg., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976).

21. See U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 2, cl.1.
22. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
23. Political question doctrine holds that certain questions and their resolutions fall within
the particular purview of legislative or executive power and consequently are not suited to judi-

cial review. See, eg., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). In other words, the actions of certain
political branches must be accorded some finality. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55
(1939).
24. Pp. 112-16 (discussing Louis Henkin, Is There a "PoliticalQuestion" Doctrine?,85 YALE
L.J. 597 (1976)).

May 1992]

The Courts and the Constitution

1245

sentational principle, the countermajoritarian principle functions categorically; it has no bounds.
In The Federal Courts in the PoliticalOrder, and indeed in his career, Professor Redish certainly has carved a niche for himself. As
this book demonstrates, one can construct a political theory that derides the "passive virtues" while avoiding the subjectivity, indeterminacy, and potential for juridical abuse inherent in the more
"progressive" political theories suggested to operate the constitutional
system. In taking this stance, however, Redish ultimately counsels toward allowing the judiciary very little flexibility in jurisdictional matters. To some federal courts scholars, Redish's antipragmatic theories
will smack of fetishistic formalism; to others they will savor of the
comfortable securities of consistency and clarity. And, although lacunae blotch those theories, they are undoubtedly important and
provocative.
-

James Hopenfeld

